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CHOICE OF LAW AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES: CONSTITUTIONS FOR
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
Paul B. Stephan*
I bring to international transactions a certain confusion of
interests. U.S. public law, especially constitutional law, invites
a consideration of the structure and design of legal institutions
and the impact of institutional design on the kinds of legal
rules that the institutions produce. I find these issues compelling, but I also find myself unable to work up much enthusiasm for the substantive content of U.S. constitutional law. By
contrast, private law, and particularly the law that governs
international commerce, fascinates me. Yet most private law
scholarship concentrates on the content of the rules and attempts to determine which outcomes might advance particular
private and societal interests. Given my concerns with lawmaking processes, I prefer to look at the institutional structures that produce those rules, and am more agnostic about
the desirability of any particular substantive outcome. What
attracts me to choice of law, then, is how it fits in with other
institutional structures that generate rules and standards
governing private international transactions that deal with
intellectual property.
I.

THE CONSTITUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONAL
LAW

To understand what choice of law does and can do, consider four highly stylized representations of different constitutions
for international transactional law.1 Each presents a distinct
allocation of authority as to the production of the substantive

* Percy Brown, Jr. Professor, University of Virginia School of Law.
1. I use the term "constitution" in the political economy sense, embracing
rules about rulemaking and not rules governing primary conduct. Put differently,
political economy envisions lawmaking as a kind of a game, a constitution as the
rules of the game, and other law as the outcome of that game. See JAMES M.
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDA-.

TIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 77-80 (1962); DENNIS C. MUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 63-64 (1996).
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rules. In other words, each specifies a different legal process
for generating substantive law.
1)

An international organization constitution designates an
authoritative international framework for generating
those rules, including an international organ that promulgates law and another that applies that law to particular events in the course of dispute resolution.

2)

A harmonization constitution recognizes some kind of
technically adept body that generates laws for political
bodies-sovereign states-to adopt through their normal
law-making processes.

3)

A choice-of-law constitution establishes a set of rules
that harmonizes the approach taken by individual states
in deciding which sovereign's laws shall apply to particular transactions. These rules might be authoritarian, in
the sense that private parties would have limited ability
to tailor transactions to come under one or another body
of law, or transactional, in the sense that parties could
choose their law as part of the transaction.

4)

A snatch-and-grab constitution allows states to assert
what authority they can over transactions, based on
their control over people and things.

Let me describe each in some detail.
An international organization suggests constitutional law
in the conventional sense. A public organ derives the authority
to enact and apply rules based on some constitutive document.
For international transactions involving intellectual property,
we have the TRIPS agreement,2 an international instrument
that both recognizes law-making authority on the part of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) to define intellectual property rights and empowers the WTO dispute resolution body to
police national adherence to the agreed rules. We also have the
European Community, which under the Treaty of Rome and its
2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-RESULTs OF THE URUGUAY RoUND vol. 31 (1994); 33
I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
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various successor treaties 3 has-the right to impose intellectual
property rules on the member states of the European Union. In
each instance, a centralized lawmaker makes the rules, to
which national and subnational bodies have some obligation to
adhere.
Harmonization shares with the first model an aspiration
to have a uniform set of rules applying globally, but approaches this goal in a less organized and coercive fashion. The World
Intellectual Property Organization and the National Commissioners for Uniform State Laws each in their own way embody
a harmonization constitution. Technically adept specialists
draft a body of rules meant to have wide if not universal applicability. A broader group then adopts the draft, which then
becomes a template for national or subnational legislation. If
the project takes off, transactors will face a single body of
rules, whether governing domain names on the Internet or the
scope of intellectual property licenses.
Professor Patchel focuses on a third strategy, namely bolstering a shared consensus among states as to the appropriate
rules for allocating lawmaking jurisdiction and choosing which
law to apply. I take her to mean this when she discusses the
systemic values implicated by choice of law. But we easily can
imagine different systems that would be consistent with this
overall concept. A more authoritarian approach, for example,
would assign jurisdiction and applicable law based on hard-tochange characteristics. An example from Europe is the rule
that, for purposes of choosing which law governs a company's
internal governance, declares that a company will be deemed
located in the jurisdiction where the preponderance of its activities takes place. Under this regime, companies can select law
only by shifting activities, which may mean moving a physical
plant, employees and offices. A more transactional approach
allows parties either to designate law by contract-the classic
choice-of-law clause-or to make formal choices that determine

3. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C

224) 1 (1992), [19921 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992), incorporating changes made by Treaty
on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) (1992), [19921 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31
I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU], and amended by Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997 O.J. (C
340) 1. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Br. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd.
5179-II), as amended by Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 741.
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which law applies. In the United States, for example, we have
reached a consensus that the place of incorporation determines
which law governs firm governance. Given how easy it is to
change the place of incorporation, firms readily can select the
rules under which they will operate.
We should not neglect a fourth alternative, which in the
contemporary world governs most applications of criminal law
and much other international regulation. Under a snatch-andgrab constitution, a state will regulate any transaction where
it has some power over the persons or assets involved. U.S.
antitrust practice offers many examples: when anticompetitive
business practices affect U.S. consumers and our government
has the ability to harass persons or assets associated with the
companies engaged in this behavior, we do not stay our hand
just because liability under our laws affects the" interests of
other nations. Title I of the Helms-Burton legislation,4 which
creates the possibility of a cause of action on behalf of victims
of Castro's expropriations against foreign businesses that "traffick" with their confiscated property, illustrates the same principle. Moreover, I take it that when Germany forbids the circulation of "hate speech" over or through the Internet, it backs
up this command through its power to prosecute persons found
in Germany who originate or receive such speech (including accessing forbidden web sites) or who facilitate such access
(Internet service providers with personnel or assets in Germany). Generalizing a bit, when a state regulates transactions
outside the territory it governs, it typically relies on a snatchand-grab principle, even though many try to justify their actions in terms of objective and systemic principles such as
"reasonableness."
Each of these constitutions identifies a locus of law-making authority: the international institution that makes and
applies law; the private groups that recommend uniform laws,
with the consent of individual states; particular states based
upon agreed upon rules; and particular states depending on
the circumstances that bring persons and things under their
power. Each affects the international licensing of intellectual
property, because each to a certain degree operates in the

4. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 6021-6091 (Supp. 1998).
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world where these transactions take place. My interest, however, is not in identifring these arrangements so much as in
developing a criteria for assessing their comparative advantages.
II. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY

OF

INTERNATIONAL

TRANSACTIONAL CONSTITUTIONS

I will not rehearse here all the pros and cons of organizing
international lawmaking through an international institution
or harmonization. Professor Janger does a commendable job of
summarizing the key points. Rather, I concede their strengths
as a method to generate comprehensive solutions to collective
action problems and instead will focus on the downside of
these approaches.
Two kinds of problems inhere in both international institutions and harmonization. The first is that private interests
may influence the lawmaking process to achieve redistributive
goals (private rent-seeking). Writers of software (licensors), for
example, might dominate the rulemaking process and impose
on the rest of the world a set of rules that diminishes overall
welfare but that make the licensors better off. To the extent
the rules are both mandatory and comprehensive, they are
more likely to have redistributive consequences. The second is
that the lawmakers may place their own institutional interest
above that of society (institutional rent-seeking). International
bureaucrats may engage in self-aggrandizement, as when they
insist on the right to approve particular national policies or endorse a proposal for legal unification that sacrifices clear policy
choices to overcome obstacles to adoption.
In earlier work I explored the ways in which international
institutions and the harmonization process might be peculiarly
susceptible to these shortcomings.' I will not repeat those arguments here, but rather rest on the assertion that, across
some range of subjects, these two strategies for organizing
international lawmaking present substantial costs that would

5. These articles include: BarbariansInside the Gates: Public Choice Theory
and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLVY 745 (1995), Accountability and InternationalLawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 681 (1996-97), The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in
International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INTL L. 743, 788-96 (1999).
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justify a search for alternative approaches. I do not claim that
international institutions and harmonization are inherently
undesirable, but rather that situations exist where they are.
Specifying the extent of such situations and their frequency is
not my purpose here.
Snatch-and-grab jurisdiction has obvious drawbacks. It
encourages opportunism by states that will seek to extract
rents from people and assets that come under their sway. Businesses will face greater legal uncertainty in the absence of
clear rules as to what law will apply to their transactions.
Universal adherence to this approach would reduce the world
of international transactions to something like Hobbes' state of
nature, "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short."6 We must
resign ourselves to the inevitability that states in extremis will
resort to snatch and grab, as a logical extension of their right
to self defense, but we do not have to like it or to tolerate any
greater use than necessary.
The question thus becomes one of envisioning how a
choice-of-law constitution would work in a world where the
other alternatives may present serious problems. A range of
options present themselves. For example, we could take an
authoritarian approach, as I noted above. This would involve a
widely adopted set of rules that look to the substance of a
transaction to assign law-making jurisdiction. To some extent
international taxation operates in this fashion, with (at least in
theory) the substance of a transaction, and not its form, dictating which state has the right to impose its taxes. Alternatively,
the great majority of nations involved in international business
might agree that across a certain range of questions parties
would have the option to choose among regulatory jurisdictions. They could implement this transactional system by
adopting a presumption in favor of honoring choice-of-law and
choice-of-forum clauses in contracts. To supplement explicit
contracting, they could agree to accept essentially formal attributes as determinative of jurisdiction, such as the place of a
party's incorporation.'

6. THOIIAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 65 (Prometheus Books 1988) (1651).
7. I describe this transactional approach in greater detail in Paul B.
Stephan, Regulatory Cooperation and Competition-The Search for Virtue, in
TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION (George Bermann et al. eds., forthcoming 2000).
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I suspect that the authoritarian approach to choice of law
has less to recommend it than might first appear. First is the
problem of incompleteness and instability. For purposes of
analysis, one should assume that the mandatory system will
impose outcomes on persons engaged in business transactions
that those persons would prefer to avoid; otherwise, such a
system would only replicate a transactional approach to choice
of law. Actors seeking to avoid undesirable outcomes face several alternatives: they may accept their fate; they may emigrate to acquire the law that they find more desirable; or they
may put pressure on their local decisionmakers to pick a different choice-of-law rule. If the first two alternatives are sufficiently unattractive, one would expect that actors would increase the pressure to undermine the regime. And because of
the interdependence of a choice-of-law constitution-the system
operates as a system only if substantially all states adhere to
the same set of rules-departures by only a few important
jurisdictions probably would lead to cascades of defections. In
short, a mandatory choice-of-law regime would cover fewer
transactions, and face greater pressures to change, than would
a transactional approach.
Second, mandatory rules generate greater costs. Mandatory application of really bad rules will lead over time to emigration; over the short run they will generate evasion. Both strategies involve the wasteful expenditure of resources. Moreover,
persons may exploit a mandatory regime to induce the government to enact rules that will hurt potential competitors, such
as by mandating barriers to entry into an industry. Whether
such attempts at rent-seeking are successful would be beside
the point, because the efforts to obtain such rules are themselves costly and wasteful.8
What, then, are the drawbacks of a largely transactional
approach to choice of law? Allowing parties either explicitly to
designate law through contract, or implicitly through the assumption of a highly mutable formal characteristic, empowers
persons engaged in market transactions. Where we have reason to suspect that markets do not work properly, this should

8. Dennis Mueller has observed that increasing mobility of firms limits the
ability of governments to engage in redistribution through taxation. Dennis C.
Mueller, Constitutional Constraints on Governments in a Global Economy, 9 CONST.
POL. ECON. 171 (1998). In the text I generalize this point to cover regulation.
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trouble us. As conventionally conceived, market failure comes
in three types: (1) incompleteness, i.e., a failure to take into
account socially important considerations such as distributive
justice or inalienable rights; (2) monopoly power due to failure
of competition; and (3) evolutionary dead ends due to standardization. I will ignore the first problem, as it is unlikely to arise
in software licensing and in any event beyond the scope of our
discussion. The second and third issues are significant.
Competition, and thus transactional choices of rules, may
break down either because of informational asymmetries or
due to monopoly problems. A familiar story justifying consumer protection rules imputes wiliness to merchants and vulnerability to the customer. Absent monopoly power on the part of
the merchant, however, this story works only if most customers are misinformed. In a competitive market merchants compete for the marginal consumer, and it does not take too many
well-informed consumers at the margin to induce merchants to
offer terms that assume full information.
But are information technology markets competitive? I will
not stray here into the troubled waters of the Microsoft litigation. Two points suffice. First, even where a firm possesses
monopoly power, either alone or as part of a cartel, it does not
follow that it always will use this advantage to induce its customers to accept bad law, as opposed to higher prices. Unless
exogenous constraints on prices exist (as in the case of regulated industries such as some forms of international transport),
we would expect monopolists to gouge through increasing revenues. Thus, even if we believe Microsoft truly is the evil empire, we still need a convincing story as to why it would exploit
its customers by choosing unfavorable legal rules. Second,
Microsoft aside, the dynamism of the information technology
markets suggests the existence of strong competitive forces.
This ferment may produce considerable uncertainty and thus
information problems, but not necessarily one-sided advantages. And we should never lose sight of how contracts function as
a means of managing uncertainty.' °

9. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for
Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV.
1387 (1983).
10. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980).
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What then of evolutionary dead ends? Some have argued
that the benefits derived from standardization of contractual
terms may deter innovation with respect to other terms. The
common metaphor is the story of the manual typewriter keyboard, which (so the story goes) reflected an effort to slow
down typists so as not to exceed the capacity of the typewriter.
Once computer keyboards appeared, the need for the function
disappeared, but the inefficient layout remained because of the
high costs involved in switching to a new system. So freedom
of contract, bolstered by a robust transactional choice-of-law
regime, might lead to the evolution of standard terms that, in
a dynamic environment, can become costly to use but even
more costly to replace."
This concern is genuine but invites two rejoinders. First, it
seems clear that the more dynamic the environment in which
contracting takes place, the greater the likelihood that breakouts from evolutionary dead ends will occur. New problems
will make reliance on learned forms and conventional terms
impossible. I need to be persuaded that the environment in
which international licensing of intellectual property takes
place is not challenging or rapidly changing. Second, I need to
be convinced that selection of mandatory rules through a legislative process, whether an international organization or a harmonization effort, will produce terms that shortcut evolutionary problems without bringing new costs. Based on the record
of both of these processes in other matters of significance to
international commerce, one cannot be optimistic.
III. CLOSING REMARKS
I intentionally have avoided addressing the topic that so
much of the discussion at this conference has confronted,
namely the desirability or flaws of the UCITA. Others, better
versed than I am in the vagaries of e-commerce and the nuances of intellectual property licensing, can take up that task.
What I have attempted to do here is sketch out a framework
for attacking that problem, by putting UCITA in a broader
context of institutional structures that produce law for interna-

11. For a review of the problem, see Clayton P. Gillette, Harmony and Stasis
in Trade Usages for International Sales, 39 VA. J. INTVL L. 707 (1999); Steven
Walt, Novelty and the Risks of Uniform Sales Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 671 (1999).
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tional commerce. My intuition is that UCITA straddles more
than one constitution, and that reconsidering how it fits in
with the. other structures might lead us to a better response to
the challenges that the new contracting environment presents.
But I leave it to others to test that hypothesis.

